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Home Delinquency Rates Are Lower Among ACA Marketplace
Households: Evidence From a Natural Experiment
By Emily A. Gallagher, Radhakrishnan Gopalan, Michal Grinstein-Weiss, Stephen P. Roll, and Genevieve Davison

Evidence presented in this brief suggests that households
gaining private health insurance under the Patient
Protection and Affordable Care Act (ACA) are significantly
less likely to fall behind on rent and mortgage payments
than are those that remain uninsured. This finding is
based on an analysis of administrative tax data from
roughly 5,000 low- and moderate-income (LMI) tax filers
living in states that did not expand Medicaid. We believe
this study to be the first quasi-experimental analysis
linking the new ACA insurance exchanges to household
finances.
Proponents of the ACA had hoped that the law would,
among other things, make insurance more affordable
for households lacking access to coverage through their
employers. Expanded insurance access was expected to
reduce the share of households that experience financial
devastation following a serious medical diagnosis.1 Yet,
despite enormous political interest in the ACA, empirical
research that documents the act’s effects on financial
outcomes is just beginning to emerge.2 Moreover,
research in this area has focused primarily on Medicaid
expansions rather than on the private insurance market.
This brief presents results from preliminary analyses on
a large and representative sample of LMI households.
The analyses seek to address this gap.3 The research
is part of a broader research agenda assessing the
relationship between the ACA and the financial security
of LMI households. The brief first provides an overview of
the insurance landscape of LMI households following the
implementation of the ACA. Then, it presents results from
a quasi-experimental analysis, which identifies a plausible
causal link between expanded access to private insurance
and improved household financial well-being for people
living near the federal poverty line (FPL).
Consistent with research on Medicaid expansions, our
data signal that medical bills from an unexpected
health event consume fewer of the resources of people

with coverage. In turn, a higher level of liquid assets
is associated with the lower rate at which households
become delinquent on housing payments. Surprisingly,
we also find that the majority of uninsured LMI filers
would qualify for Medicaid or subsidized coverage but
do not receive it. Put together, our findings spotlight a
substantial opportunity to improve the financial stability
of LMI households through assisted enrollment in the
ACA’s health insurance programs.

Background: The ACA and
the Medicaid Coverage Gap
An important goal of the ACA is to reduce the share of
uninsured Americans by increasing access to quality
health-insurance coverage. Two key aspects of the law—
the expansion of Medicaid and the provision of subsidies
to purchase private insurance—specifically target the LMI
population.4
Prior to passage of the ACA, Medicaid was primarily a
program for children, pregnant women, older adults, and
the disabled living in LMI households. States typically
did not offer Medicaid to childless adults and offered it
only to parents with incomes that were well below the
poverty line.
With the ACA’s passage, Medicaid’s focus broadened to
include able-bodied LMI adults. Through large federal
subsidies, the ACA encourages states to expand Medicaid
to the adult population earning up to 138% of the FPL. As
of 2016, 31 states (and Washington, DC) had expanded
Medicaid and 19 states had not. In states that expanded
Medicaid, adults earning up to 138% of the FPL qualify
for Medicaid; those earning between 138% and 400% of
the FPL are eligible for financial assistance in purchasing
qualified private insurance.5
The ACA also codified the construction of a private
insurance Marketplace, sometimes called the

“Marketplace” or the “Exchange,” where people who
earn too much to qualify for Medicaid can purchase
quality health insurance directly from private insurance
companies. To encourage diverse enrollment (particularly
from young and healthy people) and to provide an
affordable insurance option for LMI households lacking
access to employer-sponsored coverage, the federal
government heavily subsidizes the out-of-pocket costs
and premiums of LMI participants.

Expansion states

In particular, participants with incomes between
100% and 250% of the FPL qualify for “cost-sharing
reductions.”6 These are subsidies that reduce out-ofpocket costs, such as from deductibles and copayments,
paid when health care services are used. According to
the Kaiser Family Foundation’s calculator, cost-sharing
reductions would reduce the out-of-pocket maximum
from $6,850 to $2,250, on average, for a 30-year-old
single adult earning just over 100% of the FPL in 2016
(or about $12,000).7 The federal government pays these
subsidies directly to the insurer, and the enrollee does
not have to refund the subsidy if his/her projected
income at the time of enrollment differs from actual
income at the end of the year.
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Figure 1. Who qualifies for Medicaid and Marketplace subsidies?
States that did not expand Medicaid have different thresholds for parents.
This figure shows the average threshold for parents in 2016 for states
that did not expand Medicaid (45% of the federal poverty line), calculated
using data from the Kaiser Family Foundation.

go uninsured or purchase “catastrophic” (low-premium,
high-deductible) plans. The Kaiser Family Foundation
estimates that 2.6 million Americans are living in the
coverage gap.11

The ACA also subsidizes the insurance premiums of
participants with incomes between 100% and 400% of
the FPL.8 Premium subsidies, which the Internal Revenue
Service usually pays in advance to insurers, reduce the
monthly premium owed by the participant. Premium
subsidies are often referred to as “tax credits,” since
they must be reconciled for any difference between
projected income at the time of enrollment and actual
income on tax forms filed the following year.

Sample
Analyses presented in this brief use the tax records and
survey responses of a large sample of LMI households
over the 3-year period (2014–2016) following Medicaid
expansion and the opening of the health insurance
Marketplace. Data come from the Refund to Savings
Initiative, an ongoing partnership among Washington
University in St. Louis, Duke University, and Intuit, Inc.12
Tax data come from filers who use TurboTax Freedom
Edition online tax-preparation software to prepare
their tax returns and who consent to the use of their
anonymized data for research. In the period covered by
the brief, the software was offered for free to tax filers
who had adjusted gross income of less than $31,000, who
qualified for the Earned Income Tax Credit, and/or who
were active-duty members of the military with adjusted
gross income of less than $62,000.13

Premium subsidies decline as income rises. According
to the Kaiser Family Foundation,9 a 30-year-old single
adult earning just over 100% of the FPL would have paid
an average monthly premium of $20 ($244 per year)
after subsidies in 2016. Without the subsidies, that same
participant would have paid about $265 per month for
the same plan ($3,186 per year). That equates to 27% of
the participant’s annual income.
Because Medicaid eligibility thresholds for adults
remain so low in states that did not expand Medicaid,
a substantial share of LMI households are in what
is commonly called the “coverage gap.” As visually
represented in Figure 1, the coverage gap includes adults
who earn too much to qualify for Medicaid but too little
to qualify for Marketplace insurance subsidies, which
begin at 100% of the FPL. Since the ACA was originally
designed under the assumption that states would expand
Medicaid to people earning up to 138% of the FPL, some
households were left in insurance limbo when states
chose not to expand Medicaid. Health insurance is
usually unaffordable for people in the coverage gap.10
Adults in the coverage gap who are unable to obtain
insurance through an employer or a family member often

The analyses in this brief are based on precise
income data from Intuit’s TurboTax Freedom Edition
administrative tax records for the 2014, 2015, and 2016
tax seasons and from the Household Financial Survey
for those years. Immediately following the tax-filing
process, participants were invited to complete the
survey and were offered small financial incentives for
completion. The Household Financial Survey includes a
wide array of questions about filers’ assets, liabilities,
financial behaviors, use of social services, experiences of
hardship, and health insurance status. The survey is not a
longitudinal instrument that captures data from the same
respondents in each survey (though some tax filers may
take the survey in multiple years), but the compositions
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themselves to multiple interpretations, however.16 For
example, we measure the prevalence of a recent medical
shock using a positive response to a fairly subjective
question: “In the last 6 months, have you or has any
member of your household (the people on your tax form)
had an unexpected major out-of-pocket medical expense
(e.g., from hospitalization or emergency room visit)?”
Fortunately, we expect our key outcome variable (rent/
mortgage hardship) to be fairly precisely measured,
since it is binary and generated from a straightforward
question: “Was there a time in the past 6 months when
you or someone in your household did not pay the full
amount of the rent or mortgage because you could not
afford it?”17 Second, there is a gap of 2 to 4 months in the
data set between the point when income was measured
(at the end of the prior year) and when insurance status
was reported (at tax time of the current year). Incomes
may have changed for some participants during this
gap. Finally, as is often the case with survey data, there
might be an unknown degree of nonresponse bias. If it
is present, it could affect both the types of participants
who respond to the survey and the questions to which
they elect to respond.

Table 1. The Share of LMI Households That Are Uninsured Has Fallen
Dramatically Since 2014
Insurance status

2014

2015

2016

Employer
Family and student
VA, Medicare, and other
Marketplace
Medicaid
Uninsured
Total

27
14
10
5
11
33
100

27
18
9
8
19
19
100

28
15
9
9
22
17
100

Note. LMI = low- and moderate-income; VA = Department of Veterans
Affairs. Sampling weights are used (n = 47,317). The table presents
the percentage of low- and moderate-income households by insurance
status and year.

of the samples are similar across survey years. The
analytic sample includes 7,605 participants from the
2014 tax season, 19,825 from the 2015 tax season, and
19,887 from the 2016 tax season. The sample consists of
participants who were U.S. citizens aged 19 to 64 at the
time of data collection and for whom both administrative
and survey data are available.14
Access to administrative tax data greatly facilitates an
analysis of the ACA, since eligibility for Medicaid and
Marketplace subsidies is based entirely on a household’s
modified adjusted gross income. We merge individuallevel tax data with corresponding federal poverty
guidelines and Kaiser Family Foundation data detailing
the Medicaid thresholds for parents and childless adults
in each state and for each year. From this combined
information, we generate a precise measure of an
individual’s position relative to the FPL and eligibility
status for health care programs.

Insurance After ACA Implementation
Medicaid expansion and subsidized Marketplace
insurance have produced a sharp drop in the portion of
LMI households that are uninsured. Estimates from our
weighted sample show a decline in the rate of uninsured
LMI households since early in 2014, the year in which the
ACA Marketplaces opened: The rate dropped from 33%
in 2014 to 17% in 2016 (Table 1). Much of the reduction
stems from growth in the portion of LMI households
enrolled in Medicaid, up 11 percentage points over the
2014–2016 period. This shift represents a doubling in the
proportion of LMI households covered by Medicaid.

Since these data come from a survey of online tax filers,
the sample distribution skews toward younger adults.
However, we correct for this skew using sampling weights
and, when applicable, demographic controls. Sampling
weights based on the demographic characteristics of
the American Community Survey sample are applied
wherever statistics are intended to be representative of
the national LMI population between the ages of 19 and
64.15 Using regression analysis (not shown), we confirm
that all findings summarized in this brief are robust to the
inclusion of controls for income, age, race, number of
dependents, college completion, gender, marital status,
employment status, and student status.

As expected, however, Medicaid growth has been uneven

% of LMI population with Medicaid
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Our data set has a few drawbacks. First, there could
be a degree of misreporting, particularly for certain
variables. For example, some participants might not
know the type of health insurance they have and so may
report that they have private insurance but actually are
covered by employer-sponsored insurance. Other selfreported variables, such as a household’s total medical
expenditure, are continuous and therefore subject
to greater measurement error than are categorical
variables. Nonetheless, our concerns about measurement
error are attenuated by the high degree of correlation
among variables that are reported on both the survey
and the tax form. Certain survey questions may lend
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Figure 2. Growth in Medicaid coverage is owed to expansion states.
The figure shows the percentage of low- and moderate-income households
with Medicaid coverage, by state expansion status and year. Sampling
weights are used (n = 47,317).
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Table 2. A Third of Uninsured Respondents Live in the Coverage
Gap (n = 7,366)

Table 3. The Majority of Uninsured Respondents Currently Qualify
for Low-Cost Insurance (n = 7,366)

The percentage of uninsured respondents that…

The percentage of uninsured respondents that…

Are currently living in the coverage gap

a

Would qualify for Medicaid if their state expanded
Medicaid

2014 2015 2016
33

32

33

49

46

40

2014 2015 2016

Currently qualify for Medicaid

24

25

34

Currently qualify for subsidized Marketplace insurance

33

30

26

57

54

60

Total

Note. Sampling weights are not used.
The coverage gap refers to the income levels that are greater than
the eligibility ceiling for Medicaid but less than the eligibility floor for
subsidized Marketplace insurance.

Note. Sampling weights are not used.

across states. This trend is documented in Figure 2, which
presents results from our weighted sample: 34% of LMI
households in states that have expanded Medicaid were
covered by it in 2016, up from 20% in 2014 (the year
when most expansion states first expanded Medicaid). By
comparison, just 11% of LMI households in nonexpansion
states were covered in 2016, and that is about the same
proportion covered in 2014 (9%).

Measuring the prevalence and causes of uninsurance in the
LMI population since ACA implementation is particularly
important given the growing evidence, presented in the
next section, that health insurance coverage offers some
protection against financial distress.

a

The Effect of Marketplace Coverage
on Housing Instability

In 2016, about 33% of uninsured respondents lived
in the coverage gap between eligibility for Medicaid
and eligibility for subsidized coverage through the
Marketplace (Table 2).18 These respondents are uninsured
tax filers who have incomes below 100% of the FPL and
who live in one of the 19 states that did not expand
Medicaid to cover people making at least 100% of the
FPL. If these states expand Medicaid in the future, all
adults earning up to 138% of the FPL would be eligible.
Therefore, about 40% of uninsured respondents would
have qualified for Medicaid had all states fully expanded.

To what extent does health insurance coverage affect
financial outcomes? Although seemingly simple, this
question is surprisingly difficult to answer. A simple
comparison of the financial outcomes of people who have
insurance with those of people who lack coverage is not
particularly informative in situations where the same
factors that affect a household’s financial well-being also
affect a household’s health insurance status. For example,
unobservable characteristics like a person’s ability to plan
for the future might also drive those with good budgeting
habits to purchase insurance. If that’s so, the savings
behaviors of insured households would be better than
those of uninsured counterparts. However, it would be
inappropriate to attribute this difference to insurance
status rather than to planning and budgeting habits.

Importantly, statistics in Table 3 suggest that the
majority (60%) of the uninsured LMI households in our
sample currently qualify for either Medicaid or subsidized
Marketplace insurance in each of the states where they
live. In particular, as of 2016, 34% of uninsured filers
qualified for Medicaid, and 26% qualified for Marketplace
subsidies. Given the terms of access to TurboTax Freedom
Edition software, participation in our survey is largely
restricted to filers in households with incomes below
$31,000, and the vast majority of our respondents
have incomes below 250% of the FPL. This means that
participants would have qualified for those Marketplace
plans with relatively generous subsidy schedules. These
statistics indicate that, if our sample is representative
of the uninsured LMI population, a substantial portion of
uninsured LMI households in the United States were not
uninsured because of cost burdens alone.19, 20 Instead,
many could lack the motivation or inertia needed to
sign up or be unaware of the existence of Medicaid or
federal subsidies for Marketplace insurance, of the cost
of insurance through these programs, and/or of their
eligibility status.21

In recent work, researchers have used experimental
and quasi-experimental designs to tackle this causality
problem. In those studies, people are randomly
assigned to receive health insurance, and assignment
is based on factors that are not correlated with their
financial outcomes. Finkelstein et al. use data from a
Medicaid lottery offered to low-income adults in Oregon
in 2008.22 Results from this randomized, controlled
experiment suggest that Medicaid access lowers outof-pocket medical spending and reduces the number
of medical bills sent to collection. Changes in certain
states’ thresholds for Medicaid eligibility have enabled
other quasi-experimental studies, which indicate that
increased eligibility is associated with declines in rates
of bankruptcy, the incidence of unpaid bills, and the
amount of debt sent to third-party collection agencies.23
Similarly, Barcellos and Jacobson observe a decline in the
reported difficulty of paying bills at age 65, the threshold
at which one qualifies for Medicare.24

Our analysis suggests that nearly all LMI households in
our sample could be insured by closing the coverage gap
in states that did not expand Medicaid as well as the
gaps in inertia and awareness—gaps evident in all states.

Although there are many ways of measuring financial
distress, we focus on self-reported difficulties in making
rent or mortgage payments on time. The immediate
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% of respondents that recently
defaulted on rent or mortgage payment
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rising 10 percentage points for insured respondents
and 14 percentage points for uninsured ones.28 These
simple statistics are purely suggestive, however, and are
not intended to document the causal impact of health
insurance on financial well-being.
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If we instead compare otherwise similar households that
differ only in their eligibility for subsidized Marketplace
insurance, we can get closer to a causal interpretation.
As part of our quasi-experimental design, we exploit the
fact that some states did not expand Medicaid. Because
of the coverage gap in these states and the threshold for
accessing Marketplace subsidies, insurance is dramatically
more affordable for households with income above 100%
of the FPL. We therefore expect that the likelihood of
enrolling in coverage is higher among households with
income above that threshold than among households
with incomes that are lower but too high for Medicaid
eligibility. Hence, the subsidy threshold offers a source
of variation in insurance coverage that is not correlated
with individual’s unobservable characteristics or current
financial conditions.
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Figure 3. Rent and mortgage hardship appears linked to health insurance
coverage. Percentage of respondents that became delinquent on a rent or
mortgage payment in the last 6 months. Sample not weighted (n = 31,604).
Sample includes 2015 and 2016 respondents with incomes between 0 and
200% of the federal poverty line. Sample excludes respondents with access to
alternative forms of insurance, such as through an employer.

financial benefits of health insurance come mainly in the
form of protection against catastrophic medical expenses.25
Although a family might be able to endure mild illness
without insurance, a chronic problem like diabetes or a
severe disease like cancer could quickly exhaust the savings
and other resources of an uninsured household. Facing a
high-cost medical shock without insurance may force a
household to skip essential payments like those for rent or
a mortgage, though doing so can lead to homelessness. We
contend that financial distress is likely to be most visible
in missed housing payments as opposed to other, lighter,
and more common indicators of liquidity problems such
as missing a utility bill or credit card payment.26 Simply
put, our expectation is that increased access to health
insurance coverage will manifest in a reduced propensity to
be delinquent on essential housing payments.

Figure 4 summarizes coverage trends in 2015 and 2016 for
tax filers who have incomes in the range of 0% to 200% of
the FPL. Of these filers, 4,973 of live in states that did not
expand Medicaid and 9,018 live in states that expanded
Medicaid.29 Dots represent the mean of the y-axis variable
within small bins (ranges) of income (the x-axis variable).
Figure 4 plots the average share of respondents reporting
private insurance coverage within each bin of income.
Figure 4 shows that, consistent with our expectations,
sample participants living just above the poverty line
in states that did not expand Medicaid are about 10
Figure 4. The start of subsidies generates a jump in Marketplace
coverage in nonexpansion states. Share of respondents with private
insurance coverage. Sample not weighted. Sample includes 2015 and
2016 respondents with incomes between 0 and 200% of the federal
poverty line (FPL). Sample excludes respondents with access to alternative
forms of insurance such as through an employer. Dots represent the
averages for the observations within each of 15 bins of income on each
side of the subsidy threshold (100% FPL).

In a sense, rent/mortgage hardship for the LMI population
is analogous to bankruptcy for a wealthier population
in that both problems are indicative of a household
experiencing extreme illiquidity. As such, this analysis
may be thought of as an extension of other work looking
at the relationship between health insurance and
bankruptcy in the general population, including non-LMI
households. Indeed, bankruptcy is extremely rare among
LMI households (affecting just 1% of our sample in a
given year). This is likely due to bankruptcy’s legal cost,
restrictions on repeat occurrence, and the implications
for future credit access.27

55%

By contrast, as is documented in Figure 3, rent/mortgage
hardship appears to be fairly common among LMI
households in our sample. It also appears to be correlated
with health insurance coverage: 16% of insured respondents
and 26% of uninsured ones report rent/mortgage hardship.
The magnitude of these differences expands if we
condition the analysis on those who experienced a
medical shock, with the prevalence of that hardship
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Figure 6. Illiquidity due to medical bills declines at the threshold for
Marketplace subsidies. Mean of (logged) medical spending over liquid
assets following a medical shock. Sample not weighted. Sample includes
2015 and 2016 respondents who have incomes between 25% and 175%
of the federal poverty line (FPL) and who report experiencing a recent
unexpected medical expense. Sample excludes respondents with access to
alternative forms of insurance, such as through an employer. Dots represent
the averages for the observations within each of nine bins of income on each
side of the subsidy threshold (100% of the FPL).
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Figure 5. A jump in Marketplace coverage is linked to a decline in
rent/mortgage hardship. Share of respondents reporting delinquent
housing payments. Sample not weighted (n = 16,128). Sample includes
2015 and 2016 respondents with incomes between 0 and 200% of the
federal poverty line (FPL). Sample excludes respondents with access
to alternative forms of insurance, such as through and employer. Dots
represent the averages for the observations within each of 11 bins of
income on each side of the subsidy threshold (100% of the FPL).

percentage points more likely to obtain private insurance
than are sample participants living just below the
poverty line. Furthermore, the same demarcation in the
prevalence of private insurance coverage is not observed
among respondents residing in states that expanded
Medicaid to adults earning up to 138% of the FPL.30 In
other words, Marketplace coverage is discontinuous in
nonexpansion states among households with income
around 100% of the FPL, the threshold at which federal
subsidies come into play.

An easy falsification test is to run these same analyses on
participants living in states that expanded Medicaid (i.e.,
where there is no discontinuity in insurance coverage
at 100% of the FPL). As Figures 5(b) and 6(b) document,
expansion states show none of the same discontinuities
in financial distress evident in nonexpansion states.
These findings support the theory that the jump in
insurance access at the poverty line in nonexpansion
states is driving improvements in the ability of affected
households to make home payments.

If health insurance coverage affects financial outcomes,
discontinuity in coverage should translate into a
discontinuity in the prevalence of rent/mortgage hardship
at the subsidy threshold. As shown in Figure 5(a), the
share of participants who fell behind on mortgage or
rent payments declines by about 4 percentage points at
the subsidy threshold.31 This decline equates to a 15%
reduction relative to the average prevalence of delinquent
housing payments to the left of the threshold (27%).

Discussion
While a number of studies have documented the
importance of Medicaid coverage in reducing financial
strain among low income households,33 we believe
that this is the first study to causally link household
financial conditions and the Marketplaces established
under the ACA.
Results based on the administrative tax data and survey
responses from a large sample of LMI households during
2015 and 2016 indicate that the rate of delinquency on
rent or mortgage payments is about 15% lower among
near-poverty-line households that qualify for Marketplace
subsidies than among those that do not qualify. A
delinquent housing payment is a good signal of a
household facing an extreme liquidity problem—the kind
of problem that health insurance coverage is most likely
to measurably affect in the short term.

If, as we suspect, the mechanism driving reduced rent/
mortgage hardship is reduced illiquidity caused by
medical bills, then medical bill illiquidity should also
be discontinuous. We measure medical bill illiquidity as
the ratio of a household’s medical spending to its liquid
assets.32 Figure 6(a) illustrates medical bill illiquidity
among a subsample conditioned on reported experience of
a recent medical shock (i.e., a shock occurring within the
previous 6 months). We observe a decline of approximately
20% at the threshold in the logged value of this ratio. These
observations are consistent with what we would expect
to find if insurance reduced the degree of financial strain
generated by large, unexpected medical expenditures.

The expansion of health insurance access has a number
of direct benefits for LMI populations, which are often
less healthy than the general population, less likely to
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receive treatment, and more exposed to environmental
and social conditions that can negatively affect their overall
well-being.34 This research demonstrates, however, that
the benefits of health insurance extend beyond the direct
benefits to physical health, manifesting in financial wellbeing as well. The chief outcome explored in this study—the
prevalence of delinquent housing payments—is of particular
concern to LMI populations. Housing instability is a common
experience among LMI households.35 Moreover, housing
instability carries a number of risks beyond loss of shelter.
It has been linked to negative mental-health outcomes and
poorer early childhood developmental outcomes.36

in the form of high level statistical compilations, and individuallevel data only with the prior explicit consent of TurboTax
Freedom Edition customers. Compilations follow Intuit’s
policies and internal procedures to help ensure the privacy and
confidentiality of customer tax data.

End Notes

This brief presents new evidence that, within just 3 years,
expanded health insurance access for LMI populations
through the ACA Marketplaces likely reduced rent/mortgage
hardship, thereby, potentially lessening the prevalence
of housing instability and the associated downstream
outcomes documented by prior researchers. It follows
that future work should explore the influence of health
insurance coverage on downstream and longer term
indicators of financial well-being. For example, it would
be interesting to know whether improved, preventive
health-care access leads to higher labor output and to
college attendance of dependent children.37
This brief has demonstrated the financial benefits of
insurance, but insufficient take-up of existing low-cost
health-insurance options is now as much of a challenge as
is lack of access. Indeed, 60% of uninsured LMI households
in our survey qualified for low cost insurance, either
through Medicaid or through subsidized Marketplace
insurance, in the state where these residents lived in
2016. Future research should also explore the reasons
eligible individuals do not to acquire health insurance
through Medicaid or the subsidized Marketplace.
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We do this using a research design that requires us to restrict
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200% of the FPL and who live in the 18 states that have not
expanded Medicaid to adults earning over 100% of the FPL. In
the pooled 2015–2016 data set, 4,973 participants meet these
criteria. We exclude 2014 data from this part of the analysis
because the Marketplaces had just opened at the time of tax
filing in 2014 and we would not expect the Marketplaces to affect financial outcomes so immediately.
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30. It is interesting to note that incidence of private insurance
coverage (Figure 4) is not closer to zero even among households with incomes that are below subsidy eligibility (less
than 100% of the FPL in nonexpansion states) or that overlap
with Medicaid eligibility (less than 138% of the FPL in expansion states). There are several possible explanations. First,
there could be a degree of misreporting (see the Sample
section of this brief). Second, people who are under the age
of 30 and cannot afford private insurance are permitted to
purchase low-cost “catastrophic” plans (not sold through the
Marketplace) without paying a penalty under the ACA mandate. Third, some participants may fall into a loophole permitting people who have projected incomes above 100% of
the FPL to qualify for Marketplace premium and cost-sharing
subsidies, which don’t need to be refunded if actual incomes
later fall below the poverty line. Fourth, some enrollees may
be in quasi-retirement, having incomes below 100% of the
FPL but the necessary resources to purchase Marketplace
insurance. Finally, these participants might be recently unemployed and covered through COBRA (the common term
for postemployment coverage provisions in the Consolidated
Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1985).

15. Our weighting procedure involves estimating sampling probabilities with a logistic regression on American Community
Survey data appended onto our sample data. Weights are the
inverse of the estimated probability of being sampled. Before
calculating the weights, we restrict the American Community
Survey data set to participants aged 19 to 64 with annual
incomes below $35,000, our population of interest. Sampling
probabilities are based on the same demographic characteristics (census division, education, gender, race, and age) used
by the FINRA (Financial Industry Regulatory Authority) Investor
Education Foundation’s National Financial Capability Study.
For more on the Financial Capability Study, see http://www
.usfinancialcapability.org.
16. Participants often round their responses to continuous variables. They may also misremember or type the wrong value.
For this reason, we remove aberrant values (e.g., $1 billion)
and log all continuous variables.
17. For ease of exposition in this brief, a positive response to this
question is taken to indicate a “delinquent” housing payment
and an expression of “rent/mortgage hardship.”
18. Tables 2 and 3 do not employ sampling weights. Weights are
used in Table 1 and Figure 2 in order to make our sample demographically representative of the national LMI adult population. In contrast, Tables 2 and 3 are intended to explore only
a subset of our sample: those respondents who are uninsured
and live in states with particular program eligibility thresholds.

31. In their forthcoming working paper, Gallagher et al. (in
press) use a fuzzy regression discontinuity approach implemented through a bivariate probit model and find that a 10
percentage point increase in the probability of private insurance coverage reduces the probability of rent/mortgage
hardship by about 5 percentage points after controlling for
demographic factors.

19. We recognize that affordability is subjective and not all
LMI households would consider subsidized premiums, even
those as low as $20 per month, to be affordable. Nonetheless, in some cases, subsidized Marketplace insurance costs
less than insurance available for purchase through an employer, and take-up rates for employer insurance are high:
around 73% for households with incomes below 250% of the
FPL (Blavin, Shartzer, Long, & Holahan, 2015).

32. Medical spending includes all nonreimbursed premiums and
out-of-pocket costs. Liquid assets include bank account balances, cash, money market assets, and prepaid card balances.
33. See, e.g., Finkelstein et al. (2012); Gross and Notowidigdo
(2011); Hu et al. (2016).
34. Morello-Frosch, Zuk, Jerrett, Shamasunder, and Kyle
(2011); Woolf et al. (2015).

20. Our estimate of the share of uninsured LMI adults who are eligible for assistance appears to be similar to estimates produced
by the Kaiser Family Foundation once those estimates are adjusted to match our sample criteria (see Garfield et al., 2016).

35. Curtis, Corman, Noonan, and Reichman (2014); Kushel,
Gupta, Gee, and Haas (2006); Phinney, Danziger, Pollack, and
Seefeldt (2007).

21. Several surveys conducted by the Kaiser Family Foundation
support this hypothesis (see, e.g., Garfield et al., 2016).

36. Suglia, Duarte, and Sandel (2011); Ziol-Guest and McKenna (2014).

22. Finkelstein et al. (2012).

37. Although prior research has found significant downstream
effects on children from children’s health insurance coverage (Cohodes, Grossman, Kleiner, and Lovenheim, 2016;
Brown, Kowalski, and Lurie, 2015), research is less clear on
how coverage of adults affects the long-term financial outcomes of adults and their children.

23. Gross and Notowidigdo (2011); Hu et al. (2016).
24. Barcellos and Jacobson (2015).
25. Gross and Notowidigdo (2011); Mazumder and Miller (2016).
26. We find that 57% of sample participants who live in nonexpansion states and have incomes under 100% of the FPL report
being recently delinquent on regular bills. By comparison, 27%
report being recently delinquent on housing payments.
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